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Since the European Central Bank was established, a clear pattern of its governance has been 
that the bigger countries in the euro area – France, Germany, Italy and Spain - have been 
represented on the Executive Board. Furthermore, nationals from those countries whose terms 
had ended have been replaced by compatriots. There was one exception when Christian Noyer 
was replaced by Lucas Papademos as Vice-president in 2002, but this was intended to leave 
room  for  the  replacement  a  year  later  of  Wim  Duisenberg  by  Jean-Claude  Trichet  as 
president.  
Nothing in the treaty or the statute of the ECB suggests such a pattern. Article 112 of the 
Treaty and Article 12 of the ECB Statute only stipulate that the members of the Executive 
Board must be EU nationals and should be chosen “among persons of recognised standing 
and professional experience in monetary or banking matters”. The de facto distribution of 
seats within the ECB board according to country size is therefore a disputable interpretation 
of the Treaty which deserves scrutiny. 
There are four main reasons to criticise this practice
1: 
1.  It does not conform the spirit of the Treaty. The governance system, in which both the 
Governors  of the national  central  banks and  the  members of the Executive  Board 
participate  in the monetary policy decision,  has a  distinctive federal  character. To 
quote the Delors report which developed the blueprint for the future Eurosystem, it 
was explicitly designed as a “federative structure”. As national Governors take part in 
the Governing council, there is no need for taking national considerations into account 
also in the appointment of the Executive Board.  
2.  The  practice  of  replacing  an  outgoing  Board  member  by  a  national  of  the  same 
country unnecessarily limits the choice of the Council. Instead of having the choice 
between  several  competent  individuals  as  is  the  case  when  they  are  from  smaller 
countries, the Council essentially endorses the selection of a particular government
2. 
Furthermore, as this government is in turn certain that its candidate will be appointed, 
it does not have an incentive to put a demanding selection process in place. This lack 
of competition is not conducive to selecting the best possible candidates. In addition, 
in view of the diversity of the skills, experiences and judgements that are desirable at 
the head of the ECB, it would be appropriate in the selection process to take into 
                                                
1 Several of these arguments were mentioned already by Francesco Giavazzi and Charles Wyplosz in “Selection 
of the central bank board is a fait accompli”, The Financial Times, 10 February 2006. 
2 The Council decision is taken by qualified majority, however this only applies when there are several 
candidates from different, smaller countries.    2 
consideration professional profiles and policy philosophies. This calls for selecting the 
Board members from a larger pool of potential candidates. 
3.  In the design of the Eurosystem, as well as in practice since the start, considerable 
attention has been given to envisaging monetary policy decisions from the perspective 
of the euro area as a whole, rather than from that of any particular country. There are 
numerous manifestations of this choice, the most notable being that the Governors do 
not represent their central bank when they vote in the Governing Council and that the 
ECB publishes data for the euro area as a whole only. To have created ex-nihilo a new 
monetary entity, out of a group of countries that were only selected a year before 
monetary  union  entered  into  force,  has  been  a  remarkable  achievement  that  is 
primarily  attributable  to  the  consistent  approach  followed  by  the  ECB.  The 
perpetuation  of  a  national  approach  to  the  appointment  of  the  Executive  Board 
members appears to be inconsistent with this approach.    
4.  The institutions of a central bank need to be designed for stormy as well as for fair 
weather. This is even truer for the ECB which is in charge of a diverse monetary 
union.  The  question  must  thus  be  asked,  what  would  happen  in  an  economically 
difficult  and  politically  tense  situation?  Imagine  that  monetary  policy  needs  to  be 
tightened while one of the member countries is in a slump, or that a government starts 
alluding  to  the  benefits  of  withdrawing  from  the  euro.  What  should  then  be  the 
desirable  composition  of  the  Board?  For  the  countries  with  a  reserved  seat,  the 
potential benefit of having a national on the Board is that he or she may be better able 
to  engage  in  a  dialogue  with  public  opinion.  However,  there  are  two  potential 
drawbacks to this practice. First, the perception that EMU is dominated by a cartel 
could develop in smaller countries not represented in the ECB Board, and this might 
fuel  populist  anti-euro  campaigns  in  those  countries.  Second,  in  countries  with  a 
reserved  seat  at  the  Executive  Board,  the  perception  could  develop  that  the 
corresponding national is “our man (or woman) at the ECB” and that he or she is 
therefore  first  and  foremost  an  ambassador  –  which  would  be  in  complete 
contradiction with the spirit of EMU
3. All in all, there are most probably more risks 
than safeguards involved in the practice of reserved seats. 
The coming enlargement of the euro area is bound to make the current practice even more 
questionable. The complex rotating system put in place for the Governing Council already 
goes in the direction of giving precedence to country size over other criteria. To combine two 
rotating  systems  based  on  the  country-size  criterion,  a  formal  one  within  the  Governing 
Council and an informal one within the Executive Board, could only compound the problems 
that are already apparent.    
What should thus be done?  
There are several years ahead before a new appointment takes place. When it takes place, the 
euro area will have enlarged to several new members. The context will thus be different. This 
provides a good opportunity for reflecting on reform and for discussing proposals.  
                                                
3 This is what has gradually happened with Commissioners in several countries, in spite of the provisions of the 
Treaty which states that they are completely independent from their home country. Interestingly, it is frequently 
observed that this perception has been reinforced by the fact that all countries now appoint a single 
Commissioner.     
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There is no point in contemplating a revision of the Treaty. What is needed is to forge a 
consensus on a better way to appoint the members of the Executive Board, while ensuring 
consistency with the letter and the spirit of the Treaty.  
Desirable features of such a reform are that it gives priority to the experience and competence 
of  individual  candidates,  irrespective  of  their  nationality,  and  that  it  ensures  diversity  of 
experience, skill and policy philosophy within the Board.  
A modus operandi consistent with those goals could be as follows: 
a)  A search committee composed of senior European personalities should be appointed 
by the Eurogroup. The task of this search committee would be to identify suitable 
candidates, interview them and propose a shortlist of three. In order to avoid the 
designation of the committee itself to be dominated by short-term tactics it should be 
appointed for a sufficient term, say four years.  
b)  Ahead of the selection of candidates, the search committee should hold consultations 
on  the  professional  profile  expected  from  the  candidates.  In  view  of  the  desired 
diversity of skills within the Board, as well as of the distribution of responsibilities 
among its members, both the President of the Eurogroup and the President of the ECB 
should be given the opportunity to indicate whether some particular expertise would 
be appropriate. For example, they could indicate a wish for a candidate with first-
hand experience of financial markets, or macroeconomic forecasting, or international 
matters, etc..  
c)  Once a shortlist has been selected the European Parliament should organise hearings 
with  the  three  candidates.  This  would  be  an  opportunity  for  learning  about  their 
expertise and their views on monetary policy.  
d)  The appointment decision would remain with the Council.     
A consensus around a procedure of this kind should be sought well ahead of the appointment 
of the next Executive Board member. It could include an agreement within the Council on the 
need for national balance within the Executive Board.    
Variants of this procedure can be contemplated. What is important is to create a framework 
for selection that focuses the discussion on the skills and policy philosophies of the candidates 
rather than on their nationality. For the important issue for Europe is not what passport the 
members  of  the  Executive  Board  have  in  their  pocket,  but  what  policy  they  design  and 
implement for the whole of the euro area.   
The euro is an asset we share. It needs to be managed according to the best standards of 
central banking, not to the routines of international diplomacy.   
 